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1. Introduction 
 
Trade negotiations are generally conducted on the basis of the exchange of “concessions” 
in the form of reciprocal reduction of protection (tariffs and non-tariff barriers). It is 
somewhat disturbing that “concessions” offered by a given country, if adopted 
unilaterally, would in fact normally enhance its net welfare position. Existing levels of 
protection correspond to an equilibrium of national  political economy processes 
involving the distributive impact of the costs and benefits entailed by protection. 
Protection subsists everywhere mostly because of the lack of balance between the 
capacity to lobby effectively of inefficient or high-profit domestic producers favoured by 
protection and that of consumers of expensive or lower quality domestic substitutes of 
imports, who bear most of the cost of protection.  
 
To create the Free Trade Area of the Americas, then, is to find ways of disturbing the 
present perverse equilibrium, where protectionism thrives in practically every economy 
of the hemisphere, in the direction of an alternative zero protection equilibrium to be 
reached after a reasonable transition period. The reciprocal dismantlement of protection 
in the economies involved in the trade negotiations depends crucially on the mobilization 
of political support from groups which are likely to benefit from hemispheric integration 
to counter the political weight of those groups favoured by protection and that will be 
hurt by trade liberalization.   
 
Commitments to liberalize can of course be ineffectual if it remains feasible to adopt  
unilateral discretionary policies based on actions intending to counter the effects of 
dumping or of  subsidies, or  simply  to safeguard domestic producers from injury due to 
import surges. The issue of how binding are commitments concerning reduction of 
protection, even after the FTAA is completed, is thus crucial.  
 
Each possible FTAA member is likely to favour a strategy which will minimize offers of 
improved access to its own market upfront and assure prompt access to export markets of 
other members. The political economy of the FTAA for each possible future member   4  
boils down to finding an acceptable balance during t he transition period between benefits 
for exporters and dislocation of domestic producers whose output is displaced by imports, 
plus the effects of trade diversion. But increased exports due to improved market access 
for each FTAA member correspond to inefficient output which is displaced by trade 
creation in other FTAA markets. Thus the political economy of the FTAA is mostly 
related to the political economy of protectionism in its members and, probably to a lesser 
extent, also to the consequences of trade diversion on pre-FTAA trade.  
 
FTAA negotiations will not, of course, be restricted to market access and will certainly 
include many other issues. There is uncertainty about exactly which issues are going to be 
included in a final package. There is, to a certain extent, a trade-off  between concessions 
concerning access and comprehensiveness of agreements covering other issues. Latin 
American countries, for instance, are certainly less than enthusiastic about agreements on 
environment and labour standards, issues which are deemed as crucial by some interests 
in the United States.   
 
The next section of this paper centers on the reasons for the marked heterogeneity of 
interest concerning an FTAA in different Latin American economies. Different groups of 
economies are considered with an emphasis on their size, the present trade structure and 
trade orientation. Section 3 analyses the political economy of protection in different LA 
economies, underlines the important contrasts between past experiences of different LA 
economies in the transition from high protection to more liberal trade regimes, and 
considers possible economic reasons for such contrasts. To the extent that dismantlement 
of protection is bound to be, even if to a limited extent, reciprocal, reference must be 
made, in section 4, to the political economy of protection in the US, even if in a summary 
way as it is a theme to be treated by another paper to be presented at the conference. This 
is both because of the weight of the US economy in an eventual FTAA and because of the 
terms of the Trade Promotion Authority recently approved as well as of other recent 
decisions concerning steel imports and a new Farm Bill. Several aspects of the process of 
formation of the FTAA are considered in Section 5. These relate to liberalization 
schedules, comprehensiveness  of offers and reciprocal gains. Estimates of the FTAA’s   5  
effects are reported and considered. Its comprehensiveness, in terms of the spectre of 
issues which it will embrace, will be analysed. Finally,  the interaction, in terms of 
substance and timing, between the FTAA negotiating process and other negotiations, 
especially in the World Trade Organization, is considered. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Contrasts in the hemisphere: size and trade  
  
Once the structural characteristics of the 34 FTAA possible members are duly taken into 
account it does not seem implausible that national interests on a future FTAA should vary 
considerably. There are two striking features concerning composition of the FTAA as an 
integration initiative if it is compared to most other integration initiatives. The first is 
that, in common with NAFTA, the size of its most important member is overwhelming. 
The US answers for more than two thirds of the total GNI-PPP, almost eight times the 
size of Brazil, the second largest economy in a future FTAA. US, Brazil, Mexico and 
Canada answer for almost 90% of total FTAA GNI-PPP (see Table 1). The second 
important feature is a consequence of the first. The average size of the other FTAA 
members i s extremely small (0.5% of GDI-PPP for 31 members). Any measure of 
concentration of GNI-PPP within the FTAA underlines this fact, in contrast with other 
integration initiatives which do not include the US. The ratio between the share of the US 
in FTAA’s GNI-PPP and the average share of the other members is 76.3 compared to 
numbers in the 2.0-7.4 range for the CACM., Andean Community, European Union, 
Caricom and Mercosur. Bargaining power of members of other initiatives such as the 
European Union tends to be less concentrated both because there is a group of “big” 
economies more or less of the same size at the core of the decision-making process, and 
not just a single dominant big economy, and because of the average size of the other 
members is bigger. 
  
The  larger an economy is, the more likely is that political economy processes related to 
integration include, rightly or wrongly, the perception that the country does have the 
bargaining power to influence the stance of bigger partners and the outcome of 
negotiations. The smaller is an economy, the more likely is that the traditional small 
country status is generally accepted. Coalition-building may qualify this assertion, but if   6  
small economies are really small, as is the often the case in the FTAA, even perfect 
coalitions would yield blocs with very limited bargaining power.     
 
Mercosur economies constitute by far the most significant share of FTAA trade and GNI-
PPP, in both cases excluding NAFTA economies. They answer for about half FTAA’s 
non-NAFTA trade a nd almost two thirds of FTAA’s non-NAFTA GNI-PPP (see Table 
2). Since many of the issues under discussion in the FTAA are related to the size of 
markets rather than directly to trade, perhaps the GNI-PPP share is a better indication of  
national relevance in the FTAA. But still it is important to stress the wide contrasts in the 
relative importance of trade for different Latin American economies. The share of total 
trade in GNI-PPP is less than 10% in Mercosur, explained by a combination of a long 
tradition of inwardness, the continental features of the Brazilian economy and, especially 
in the case of Argentina, obstacles to the expansion of agricultural exports due to 
protection in developed markets. It is also very low in Colombia (10%) and Peru (11.6%). 
The more open economies in the hemisphere are those more dependent on the US market: 
Canada (almost 70% ratio of total trade to GNI-PPP), Mexico (about 40%), Caricom 
economies  (44.7%) and Venezuela (36%). Chile (25.2%) and the US (20.7%)  are in the 
intermediate range.   
 
Another important source of contrasts between Latin American economies is the relative 
importance of intra-FTA trade, trade with the United States, trade with the hemisphere 
and trade outside the hemisphere (see Table 3). Some of  the  economies in the Southern 
Cone, especially those of Mercosur, which are more closed, have a geographically more 
diversified trade than those economies which are more open and nearer to the US. This 
reflects the similar natural resource endowments of US and Mercosur if compared to 
those of most other Latin American economies.  
 
Canada and Mexico concentrate about  80% of their trade in the US, CACM economies 
about 50%, and Caricom and the Andean Community around 40%. This falls to around 
20% in Mercosur and Chile. Economies such as Canada  and Mexico have a very small 
share of their trade with the hemisphere excluding NAFTA, and also outside the   7  
hemisphere. With the exception of Chile and Venezuela, the share of trade of all 
hemispheric economies with the hemisphere, excluding the relevant FTA and the United 
States, is rather small. Similarly, with the exception of Canada and Mexico, and to a 
lesser extent, the US in relation to NAFTA, as well as Argentina in relation to Mercosur, 
intra FTA-trade tends to be no m ore than around 10% of total trade in most other 
economies.  
 
Although the importance of trade diversion generated by preferential trade agreements is 
often exaggerated, it is the more significant for a specific economy, the higher is the share 
of non-FTAA imports in its total imports. Similarly, the more geographically diversified 
is the trade of a given economy, the more likely is that multilateral concerns prevail over 
the regional perspective.  
 
Contrasts between the levels of protection in different hemispheric economies are less 
marked than generally taken for granted. Progress towards lower protection since the 
mid-1980s in Latin America has been substantial. In the late 1980s, in the more extreme 
cases average tariffs considerably exceeded 50% and imports of many products were  
prohibited. Trade liberalization proceeded very fast in the early 1990s, but became 
somewhat bogged down after the middle of the decade, especially in Southern South 
America. Based on simple average tariffs and not taking non-tariff barriers into account 
(see Table 4) there is a small group of economies with a low average tariff level: Canada 
and the US in the 4-5% range, CACM and Chile in the 5-8% range. Most other average 
tariffs are in the 11-14% range.
2 The highest average tariffs are in the 16-21% range for 
                                                                 
2 It should be kept in mind that reference h ere is always to applied tariff rates. In most Latin America 
economies tariff lines have been bound in the WTO at 35% for industrial products. For some agricultural 
produts bound levels are higher. Applied rates are thus much below bound rates. For the US  and Canada 
applied rates are generally those bound in the WTO. The adoption of bound rates as a basis to start tariff 
eduction in the FTAA framework would only be feasible if the US strategy included acceptance of a grace 
eriod before trade liberalization started to be effective in Latin America.    8
 
Table 1 
Selected FTA initiatives: data on the relative size of participants %
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Table 2 
Western Hemisphere: Gross National Income-PPP and total 
trade in goods, main FTAs and main economies, 2000 










Nafta   11350  2869  .253 
   Canada  840  529  .628 
   Mexico  864  341  .395 










   Colombia  249  25  .100 
   Peru  121  14  .116 
   Venezuela  139  50  .360 
Caricom
4   38  17  .447 
CACM
5  128  35  .273 
Mercosur
6  1747  171  .098 
   Argentina  448  49  .109 
   Brazil  1245  111  .089 
Other  216  64  .296 
   Chile  139  35  .252 
   Other
7  77  29  .377 
Total  14045  3225  .230 
1 GNI-PPP in 2000 from World Bank, World Development Report 2001/2002.   
2 Trade data for 2000 from International Monetary Fund , Direction  of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook 2000. Trade data for Costa Rica are for 1999 and for Haiti 
are for 1998. For most Caricom economies trade data are for years before 2000 
as available in the IMF data.  
3 Other members: Bolivia and Ecuador. 
4 Members: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
5 Members: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
6 Other Members: Paraguay and Uruguay. 
7 Dominican Republic, Haiti and Panama. 
 
Mexico and Caricom. It is, of course, important to qualify any statement based on high 
simple average tariff levels by the fact that a trade-weighted tariff taking into account 
preferential arrangements could generate quite different numbers. Especially in the case 
of Mexico, given the importance of intra-NAFTA trade, the relevant weighted average 
tariff is much lower than the simple average tariff. Trade creation following the FTAA 
would tend  to be more important in those economies with a higher simple average tariff 








Western Hemisphere: Shares of  intra-FTA trade, trade with the rest of the hemisphere, trade 
outside the hemisphere and trade with the United States for selected economies and FTAs, 2000, %  
   Share of  intra-
FTA trade in 
total trade
1  
Share of trade 
with the US in 
total trade
1 
Share of trade 




Share of trade  




Nafta  46.5  ---    5.3   48.2  
    Canada  78.5  76.7  1.3  20.2 
    Mexico  82.9   80.7  3.3  13.8 
    United States  32.2  0  6.7  61.1 
         
Andean    









    Colombia  15.3  42.7  15.0  27.0 
    Peru  9.3  28.2  19.3  53.2 
    Venezuela  5.9  45.0  27.6  21.5 
         
Caricom
2  11.2  38.2  12.3  49.5 
         
CACM  11.4  47.5  13.3  27.8 
         
Mercosur  20.9  20.4  11.0  47.7 
     Argentina  30.9   15.7  11.6  41.8 
     Brazil  13.9  23.5  10.8  51.8 
         
     Chile  ---  18.4  30.6  51.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction  of Trade Statistics Quarterly December 2001 
and International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2000. 
1Total trade includes FTA-trade (exports and imports of all partners). 
2 Excludes Antigua. Data for 1999.  
 
Dispersion of the Mexican, Caricom and US tariff is rather high if compared to that of 
Mercosur and several of the Andean economies, and as the US average tariff is low, the 
US tariff coefficient of variation is the highest in the hemisphere. The proportion of ad 
valorem tariff lines above 15%  – tariff peaks – in the hemisphere varies between  3.54% 
of all ad valorem tariff lines in the US to a range between 40 and 50% in Mercosur. Data 
presented in Table 4, however, only include tariff lines for which there is an ad valorem 
tariff. Since, especially in the case of the United States, specific duties are frequent, this 
omission significantly affects any assessment of protection. For 2000 there is information 
on ad valorem e quivalents of specific duties imposed in the US. Data indicate that the 
number of total US tariff lines exceeding 15% would be almost doubled, if account is 
taken of the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties, to reach a total of about 500. The   11 
number of tariff lines above 35% would be affected even more significantly, rising from 
30 (ad valorem)  to a total 107 (ad valorem and ad valorem equivalents of specific 
tariffs).
3 In most Latin American economies, on the other hand,  the role of specific duties 
is insignificant. In some Latin American economies agricultural products are significantly 
protected. Most of them, but not all, are net importers of agricultural products: Mexico, 
Venezuela, Peru and most of Central America and the Caribbean. In Chile, Colombia and 
Peru there are price bands in operation which dampen the effect of world price 
fluctuations on domestic prices through the use of variable duties. The mean tariff on 
agricultural products in Canada and Mexico is around 22-23% and there are also m any 
tariff peaks, specific duties and tariff quotas. In the Caribbean such means are even 
higher. 
4   
 
Table 4 
Western Hemisphere: Simple average tariffs,  standard deviations, coefficients 
of variation and tariff peaks, main FTAs and main economies, 2001
1 




deviation   
Coefficient of 
variation  






Nafta            
   Canada  4.2  7.2  1.71  11.63  0.09 
   Mexico  16.7  14.1  0.84  47.90  0.63 




         
   Colombia  11.6  6.3  0.54  23.86  0.19 
   Peru  13.5  3.7  0.27  16.05  0.00 
   Venezuela  12.0  6.0  0.50  24.26  0.00 
Caricom
2  17.7-20.9  11.1-15.3  0.58-0.84  35.74-71.06  8.21-25.17 
CACM
   5.1-7.6  6.9-9.2  1.04-1.77  0.43-24.73  0.15-1.12 
Mercosur
            
   Argentina  13.4  6.6  0.49  49.98  0.40 
   Brazil  13.2  6.8  0.52  41.18  0.04 
Other           
   Chile  8.0  0.0  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Source: Hemispheric Trade and Tariff Database. 
1For some of the smaller economies information is for 1999 or 2000. 
2Excluding the Bahamas,  whose simple average tariff is  0.6%, with a standard deviation of 6.7% 
and a variation coefficient of 11.17, and whose percentage of tariff lines above both 15% and 35% 
is 0.27%. 
 
                                                                 
3 Ad valorem equivalents provide lower bound estimates for the protective effect as they are lowered by 
tariff reductions enjoyed in the US by preferential trade partners.  
4 Data supplied by Marcos Jank: IDN-INT  calculations based on data from the 2001 Hemispheric Database 
of the Americas and  AMAD.   12 
Tariff peaks in the US are concentrated in a relatively small number of chapters. Table 5 
below shows the data for those tariff chapters where the average ad valorem tariff is more 
than double the average tariff: tobacco products, footwear, textiles and clothing, dairy 
products, agricultural products such as nuts, v egetables and fruit juices. There is also a 




Another source of distortion in the evaluation of protection in hemispheric markets refers 
to non-tariff barriers or tariff quotas. These are more significant in the US than in other 
economies in the hemisphere affecting, for instance, trade in textiles, clothing, sugar and 
tobacco. There are also contingency measures such as safeguards and anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties which the US can use more effectively than its partners in the 
hemisphere due to its bargaining power. The same applies to Section 301 and related 
measures.
6 These issues are likely to be of paramount importance in the formation of the 
FTAA as will be seen in section 5.    
 
It is rather more difficult to single out peaks in Latin America markets as tariff dispersion 
is much lower and average tariffs much higher. In Mercosur, for instance, there are no 
less than 35 HS chapters with average tariffs  between 16% and 23%.
7 From the more 
disaggregated perspective: tariff peaks are concentrated most of all in transport 
equipment (31-36% range)
8 as well as in dairy products, capital goods (chapters 84 and 
85) and footwear (26-31% range). There is also a high incidence of tariff peaks in the 21-
                                                                 
5 It has been suggested that the abolition of tariff peaks in the US on Brazilian exports of `other agricultural 
products and food industry´ products, that is their reduction to 15% ad valorem, would halve the average 
tariff rate from 18.2% to 9.1% See Bouët, Fontagné, Mimouni and Pichot (2001). Quite often US extremely 
high peaks on agricultural products are hidden by disaggregation. The 8 -digit tariff on line 24011065 
"Tobacco, not stemmed or stripped, not or not over 35% wrapper tobacco, flue-cured burley, etc" is 350%, 
but at the 6 -digit level the internationally comparable tariff on line 240110, “Wrapper tobacco”, is a much 
more innocent looking average of 42.5%, see Marcos Jank, `A complexidade das negociações 
internacionais´, O Estado de São Paulo , 16.4.2002. 
6 See US Trade Policy Review 2001 in www.wto.org. 
7 These are the values for Brazil. 
8 This is the most extreme case of  protectionist inertia in Mercosur. It is of interest to note, in the context of 
the political economy of protection, that demandeurs of a high common Mercosur external tariff 
traditionally includes in a prominent position multinationals producing motor cars and capital goods which 
fear to lose their cosy protected markets. See, for perhaps an extreme view, Yeats (1999).   13 
26% range in many other chapters which cover food residues, leather goods, textiles and 
clothing, and  capital goods (other than chapters 84 and 85).
9   
 
Table 5 
United States: : Simple average tariffs,  standard deviations, coefficients of variation and tariff peaks,  
2001   






of variation  
Share of  
specific  
duties in 
tariff peaks  





04 Dairy products  12.4  5.0  0.40  69.7  100 
07 Edible vegetables  9.0  7.6  0.84  12.5  --- 
19 Preparations of cereals  9.1  5.8  0.63  58.3  100 
20  Preparations of vegetables  11.3  21.9  1.94  18.2  25 
24 Tobacco and manuf. tobacco  90.7  156.3  1.72  40.0  33.3 
52 Cotton  9.2  3.9  0.42  28.6  100 
54 Man-made filaments  10.9  3.9  0.36  0                  0 
55 Man-made fibres  11.4  4.0  0.35  100  --- 
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics  10.9  3.9  0.36  0  0 
61 Apparel and clothing, k. & c.  12.7  8.4  0.66  21.7  0 
62 Apparel and clothing, n.k.& n.c.  10.7  7.4  0.69  37.8  --- 
64 Footwear   14.1  14.2  1.00  35.1  24 
Source: Hemispheric Trade and Tariff Database. 
  
 
Jank, Fuchsloch and Kutas (2002) have used a “relative tariff ratio” (RTR) index
10 as a 
synthetic indication of the imbalances among different prospective FTAA members on 
the relative importance of protection affecting their agricultural and non-agricultural 
exports and imports. The index is a ratio between tariffs faced by country A in country B 
and tariffs imposed by country A on imports from country B.  Tariffs in each country are 
weighted by the other country´s exports. In the case of RTRs for the United States,   
Brazil is the extreme case of divergence between for agricultural products (very low 
RTR) and non-agricultural products (very high RTR) among western hemisphere 
economies, reflecting the protectionist stances of the US for agricultural goods and of 
Mercosur for industrial goods.
11  
 
                                                                 
9 Hemispheric Trade and Tariff Database. See Jank, Fuchsloch and Kutas (2002) for a comprehensive  
analysis of protection in the FTAA with emphasis on agricultural products.  
10 As proposed by Sandrey (2000). 
11 Divergences for other Mercosur economies, Venezuela and Caricom are also substantial.     14 
Most antidumping activity in the Americas involves either as origin or destination the 
five  largest economies: the US, Brazil, Mexico, Canada and Argentina.
12 The US and 
Brazil initiated about 60% of all FTAA actions. Actions by the US are heavily 
concentrated in base metals, while AD actions by other countries are more evenly 
distributed between sectors.    
  
Other issues such as services also involve access. But the definition of levels of 
protection are considerably more complex than in the case of goods. Main gaps to bridge 
between the position of the US and that of at least some of the Latin American economies   
involve coverage criteria and modes of delivery. Services and investment issues are 
closely related, especially in a context such as that of recent years, when most of the FDI 
flows into Latin America was directed to the provision of public services. Other 
controversial FDI issues include those related to compulsory local content, technology 
transfer and also to chapter 11 NAFTA-like rules involving dispute settlement  between 
foreign investors and host governments.  
 
3.  The political economy of protection in Latin America: the inertia of history  
 
Lack of a sufficiently long stable democratic tradition is an obstacle to the consolidation 
of transparency in electoral processes and adequate analysis of the political economy of 
protection  using standard models. Lobby for protection without a fully working 
democratic regime is bound to be even less transparent than under the usually established 
checks and balances. It thus affects any credible estimate of mobilization of lobbying 
resources a nd its possible links to tariff-formation. Political instability is bound to affect 
the stability of political-support functions since losses to the general population are not 
constrained by the usual electoral requirements which apply under democratic rules. Lack 
                                                                 
12 These economies have initiated 410 out of the total 485 actions initiated by prospective FTAA members 
in 1987-200. See Tavares (2002). In Brazil, there is a concentration of actions involving chemical products 
see www.mdic.gov.br/comext/decom/decom.html.   15 
of transparency also affects any attempt to explain protection by a campaign 
contributions approach or by a political contributions approach.
13 
 
As the position stands, at least in some of the big Latin American economies there is a 
very limited tradition of open discussion of the consequences of protection in terms of 
costs and benefits for different sections of the society. The links between the credibility 
of pledges by politicians and voting patterns are extremely fuzzy. This helps to explain 
why there is a patent lack of consciousness by different segments of the society about the 
distributive impact of protection.  
 
To a large extent what appears simply as a myopic behavior is due to history. Inertial 
elements are of paramount importance in the political economy of protectionism in  
economies such as Brazil. There has been a tradition of high protection since the mid-19
th 
century. More recently, in the 1947-1990 period, there was absolute protection against 
imports of many products. But at the s ame time high growth was achieved in the 20
th 
century, at least until the 1970s. The Brazilian experience stands as the most successful 
among developing economies. Growth was faster only in Japan and Finland.
14  It has 
been suggested that it was possible to maintain a high tariff in Brazil because higher 
production costs affecting exports could be significantly transferred to coffee 
consumers.
15 This was due to the combination of a dominant position in the world coffee 
market, the importance of the coffee export economy in the Brazilian economy as a 
whole, and the low price elasticity of coffee demand. Attempts to raise protection in other 
commodity exporters raised the opposition of exporters who were price takers, rather than 
price makers, in their main commodity markets, and increased input prices resulted either 
in reduced mark ups or reduced market shares in the world markets. It was not that Brazil 
was able to avoid the costs entailed by a high tariff. It was a rather a question of at least 
                                                                 
13 See Rodrik (1995) for the standard review of alternative political-economy models. See also Helpman 
(2002). Much of the political  economy literature requires substantial adjustment to be applied to the 
formulation and implementation of commercial policy in economies with institutional characteristics rather 
different from those in the US.   
14 See Maddison (1995). 
15 See Abreu and Bevilaqua (2000).   16 
partly compensating such costs at the expense of world coffee consumers.
16 As coffee 




After the 1929-1933 recession in Latin America, protection became widespread in many 
cases in the form of quantitative restrictions implicit in exchange controls. The strategy of 
import substitution by means of high protection was adopted by many smaller Latin 
American economies which had small shares in world commodity markets and whose 
market size  only allowed extremely inefficient domestic production.. Foreign exchange 
regimes adopted after World War II entailed severe anti-export bias. But it is important to 
recognize that to some extent such policies were the result of the contraction of 
traditional export markets rather than just the result of primitive reasoning by populist 
politicians.
17   
  
The attraction of direct foreign investment even in the larger economies starting in the 
1950s included policies that assured that competition would be limited to few entrants 
protected by very high tariff walls. This has created a strange Latin American 
phenomenon: multinationals which played, and continue to play, a crucial role in trying 
to delay trade liberalization because they have a long-established vested interest in 
protection. From the mid-1960s, the more extreme version of the autarchical model 
started to be abandoned in many Latin American economies as there was growing 
concern about the sustained anti-export bias of many of the previous international 
economic policies. But it is wrong to say that policies became outward-looking as 
domestic markets were opened slowly and, indeed, as a reaction to oil shocks and the 
following debt crisis, trade liberalization was reversed. In the mid-1970s  nominal t ariffs 
could be typically very high or protection could even be absolute due to import controls, 
but this was coupled with the discretionary distribution of tariff exemptions and 
                                                                 
16 This resulted, of course, in important income transfers from consumers of imports to coffee growers. 
17 See Fodor (1975) for a persuasive analysis of the policy choices available for Argentina in the immediate 
post-World War II period and the conclusion that not all of the Argentinian anti-export bias was due to 
either Perón’s stupidity or wickedness, as suggested by many analysts, but to the recognition that it was 
preferable to increase real wages and let the masses eat more beef than accummulate idle unconvertible 
assets in European central banks.   17 
reductions so that the collection of import duties was not very significant. Exports, on the 
other hand, were heavily subsidized, especially, but not exclusively, in the context of 
attracting foreign direct capital using fiscal rebates linked to future export performance. 
The spectacular increase in the share of industrial products in the total exports of 
economies such as Brazil from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1980s was a direct result 
of such subsidies. In a way, it is possible to say that foreign economic policy-making 
remained very much based on pick-the-winner strategies.  The differences were that there 
was a relay of pickers, with the military in full control for a long period, and that instead 
of picking winners in connection with import substitution, as until the 1960s, the scope 
was widened to include those who were thought to be promising future exporters. So 
rent-seeking, after being concentrated for a long period in import substitution projects, 
and the consequent demands for protection, came to play a crucial also in the distribution 
of export subsidies. Conventional wisdom on the links between outwardness and growth 
only took account of such distortions quite late in the day.
18 
  
Since the late 1970s, but more markedly from the mid-1980s, trade liberalization came to 
be adopted as a pillar of comprehensive economic reform in most Latin American 
economies, even in those economies which were more reluctant to change traditionally 
protectionist policies. There was substantial unilateral trade liberalization, with sharp 
reductions in average tariffs and dismantlement of non-tariff barriers. Recourse to 
quantitative restrictions under article XVIII:B of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, once frequent, almost disappeared. In the Uruguay Round, most Latin American 
countries bound 100% of their tariff lines on industrial products which converged to a 
maximum of 35% in five years. But in most cases applied tariffs are much below bound 
levels.   
 
This shift in policies was due to the recognition that import substitution had failed to 
provide the incentives for high growth even in the economies where the strategy had been 
more successful in the past. Imports had been reduced so much that even a  further 
                                                                 
18 World Bank (1987). The relatively low shift towards trade liberalization was also related to the high 
priority in most Latin American economies of generating trade surpluses to service the significant foreign 
debt.   18 
spectacular surge of import substitution (much more difficult to attain) had no significant 
overall impact. Moreover, long-term costs of protection became explicit, as exports faced 
increasing problems due to their lack of competitiveness aggravated by inefficient 
investment outlays in high-cost domestically produced capital goods. Exports subsidies 
also became an excessive  fiscal burden in a context where there was much more 
competition for scarce public funding. 
 
While commitment to trade liberalization is probably high in most of Latin America there 
are important actual or potential sources of resistance to its deepening,  especially in the 
Mercosur. As the Argentinian economy faces its most dramatic crisis in independent 
history, it is open to question whether commitment to more open markets in the future is 
feasible independently of what is exactly going to be the mid-term outlook from a 
political point of view. The present crisis tends to undermine commitment to reform and 
it is not uncommon to hear comments suggesting that Argentina’s collapse was due to the 
reforms undertaken since the beginning of the 1990’s.  
 
Similarly in Brazil, cavalier comments on the shortcomings of trade liberalization of the 
“too-fast and too-deep” kind are mingled with criticisms of the excessively long period 
during which the exchange rate was allowed to remain overvalued in the expectation of 
the beneficial consequences of a comprehensive reform program that in the end was only 
partly implemented. Consistently with the country’s position as a laggard liberalizer in 
the Latin American context, the domestic debate on “industrial policy” shows a 
widespread reluctance to engage in further liberalization, especially in the FTAA context. 
The political element is perhaps paramount as there is much suspicion surrounding the 
decision to have closer ties with the US. But, in addition, the lack of economic 
sophistication of stances adopted by the average politician on trade matters may come as 
a surprise to newcomers.  Mercantilist ways of thinking are pervasive, with frequent 
arguments on the need to redress sectoral balance of payments imbalances through  more 
interventionist policies seeking import substitution and “increasing the value added” of 
exports. The protectionist, or latently protectionist, coalition is extremely wide and 
includes domestic entrepreneurs, unions and, frequently in a prominent position,   19 
multinationals seeking to protect their  chasse gardée  recovering typical past stances 
adopted in the golden age of import substitution industrialization.  All candidates during 
the recent presidential campaign emphasized how desirable was a return of more 
interventionist “industrial” policies. Victory of the opposition in October, 2002, shall 
mean, in principle, that the future stance on foreign economic policy is likely to be 
significantly less liberal than that adopted since the late 1980s and that  a revival of 
protectionism is not unlikely. It is true that the victorious opposition seems to have  
reversed rather sharply its long-standing sweeping condemnation of orthodox 
macroeconomic economic policies. But it is unlikely that this volte-face spreads to trade 
policies.    
  
The stance of multinationals concerning the political economy of protection in Latin 
America tends to be much more diversified nowadays than it was in the high tariff period. 
There was a spectacular increase of FDI in Latin America in non-tradable sectors such as 
banking and public services. These firms have a vested interest in the opening up of the 
Latin American economies and particularly in the stability of the macroeconomic 
environment.  Most of the FDI in other sectors than services was directed to plants which   
were not necessarily geared exclusively to the domestic markets even in the larger 
economies. But it is still true that many multinational firms, especially when supplying 
large domestic markets, are crucial  demandeurs of sustained protection and export 
subsidies and still enjoy effective protection well above 35% in the more protected 
economies. 
  
4. The political economy of protection in the United States:  ominous developments 
 
Some of the features of protection in  the United States which constitute important 
obstacles to a successful FTAA negotiation have already been indicated in section 2. In 
spite of the low average tariff, the US tariff schedule includes a relative large number of 
tariff peaks (above 15%) and of very high tariffs (above 35%), in the form of ad valorem 
and specific tariffs, in contrast with most other  hemispheric economies. These sectors – 
textile and apparel, agricutural products  –  as well as steel products, which answer for   20 
most antidumping actions, are the more sensitive products from the US viewpoint and are 
also the most important for its FTAA partners.  
 
The analytical framework of many analyses of FTAA  takes at least implicitly as a matter 
of course that the FTAA should be an extension of the NAFTA, or at least that the 
question can be treated as if the US occuppied a de facto hub position, with all the Latin 
American and Caribbean non-NAFTA economies anxious to qualify for entry. The 
economic policies of Latin American countries are assessed for “readiness” to enter the 
FTAA, as if the whole exercise could be reduced to a club formation activity under the 
supervision of NAFTA members.
19 There is less symmetrical effort to consider readiness 
from the point of view of the political economy of protection in the NAFTA members, 
and especially of the United States, a determinant factor for the success of the preferential 
trade arrangement as a result of negotiations based on mutual concessions.  
 
In spite of incitations, cogently expressed already in the mid-1930’s by internal critics of 
protectionism, that US policy should seek to manage political pressures by protection- 
seeking lobbies rather than letting them “run wild”
20, more recent US trade negotiating 
strategy has traditionally reflected the strength of those sectors more “sensitive” to the 
competition of imports. A direct result has been the US emphasis on a pick and choose 
approach to dismantlement of tariff, and, more rarely, non-tariff barriers, to the detriment 
of a comprehensive dismantlement of protection based on reduction formulae applied 
without exceptions. This emphasis on selectivity has converged with a similar outlook in 
the European Union, with its long standing strategy of placing high priority to resisting  
liberalization of t rade in agricultural products. Combined with the pressure since the 
1980s to continuous widening of the multilateral trade negotiations agenda through the 
inclusion of new issues, this has resulted in a significant backlog of unfinished business, 
mostly affecting traditional issues in relation to which developing economies, that is most 
of prospective FTAA members, are  demandeurs. US expressed wishes to take into 
account “product sensitivities”-- in USTR lingo
21 -- points out to a likely reincidence into 
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a n egotiation strategy that will leave a backlog constituted of products or issues which are 
sensitive for the US but also an essential part of the agenda for most of the other FTAA 
members .  
 
The second feature of US trade policy which raises difficulties f or a successful 
conclusion of the FTAA negotiation is related to uncertainty about how binding are US 
commitments concerning market access. What is at stake is whether, even if mutually 
advantageous reciprocal tariff concessions can be made during the transition period 
towards a preferential trade area, the US can assure its future partners that market access 
in the US will not be prevented by anti-dumping or safeguard actions or similar 
discretionary instruments.       
  
Recent decisions on US trade policy such as the Trade Promotion Authority signed in 
August, 2002, together with the safeguards affecting US steel imports and the new Farm 
Bill, give an indication of the obstacles which will have to be surmounted for the 
successful conclusion of an FTAA. Such a radical shrinking of the “win-set”, that is of 
the set of possible outcomes of international negotiations given the restrictions imposed 
by the domestic political economy of protection, enhances significantly the already 
immense bargaining power of the bigger player. But such a development may simply be 
an overkill and thus reduce radically the likelihood of the other parties in the international 
negotiation  accepting the signalled terms.
22   
 
The approved TPA  removes some of the provisions of former drafts which in the words 
of USTR Zoellick would  "cripple America's (sic) ability to open markets around the 
world."  The Dayton-Craig Senate amendement which would have allowed Congress to 
veto specific provisions of trade pacts if they changed US anti-dumping and other so-
called “trade remedy” laws has gone. So has a previous clause on remedies to counter the 
allegedly unfair competition of goods produced in economies which resort to foreign 
exchange devaluation. But by creating a more ellaborate compulsory consultation process 
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between USTR and Congress it continues to make difficult US commitments to improved 
access for a significant list of “import-sensitive” products, particularly agricultural goods.  
  
The US decision on steel safeguards does not create a concrete obstacle to negotiations. It 
is also true that the decision has been followed by many exclusions which have reduced 
its initial  distortions. But the move underlines the vulnerability of any negotiation on 
access based exclusively on tariff and  NTBs bargaining. Perhaps more seriously, it 
underlines the US administrations´s inability to live up to its alleged commitment to free 
trade. It is of course true that NAFTA members have been excluded from the list of 
countries affected by the steel safeguards. But, besides doubts about the WTO-legality of 
such exclusions, it is not entirely clear whether the US would be willing to make such 
exclusion clauses a feature of the FTAA.   
  
The Farm Bill has dramatically increased US agricultural subsidies. While the total 
amounts to be spent are still within the caps set in the Uruguay Round there are doubts 
whether the administration will indeed have the political clout to make use of the trigger 
mechanism which allows the reduction in subsidies in case world a gricultural prices fall 
further and the WTO subsidy caps are exceeded.  In any case is difficult not to see the 
decision as a further surrender to protectionist pressures by the US administration. These 
US decisions boil down to “padding”, that is, increase of protection within the maximum 
levels multilaterally agreed so as to cut water in a prospective negotiation. Some 
comments  on this decision are candid:  “the 2002 farm bill and the steel relief measures 
gave [Latin America]  additional incentives to enter a regional trade pact whose rules and 
understandings might roll back such protectionist policies and make them less likely in 
the future”.
23  This is to be deplored, especially when the Latin American economies 
agreed in the context of the FTAA negotiations to consider applied tariff rates as the 
initial tariff levels to be considered in the tariff reduction schedules rather than those, 
much higher, rates bound  in the Uruguay Round.  
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5. The FTAA negotiation process  
 
There are several alternative estimates of the impact of the FTAA on particular 
economies and specific sectors from the point of view of trade and welfare based both in 
the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium frameworks. For instance, Monteagudo 
and Watanuki (2002) estimated recently the impact of FTAA trade liberalization 
(excluding non-tariff barriers) using a CGE model incorporating trade-related 
externalities and economies of scale. They suggest that hemispheric real GDP would 
increase 0.55%, ranging from 0.33% for NAFTA and 2.23% for Mercosur with Chile, 
Central America and the Andean Community roughly between 1.4 and 1.8%.
24 There 
would be an expansion of exports substantially higher than imports in most FTAA 
economies. Only Canada, Mexico and Venezuela would be exceptions. Exports would 
expand 1.7% in NAFTA members, 4.7% in Mercosur, 5.2% in Chile, 4.4% in the  
Andean Community and 6.7% in Central America and the Caribbean.
  These aggregate 
data, however, may hide important inter-country contrasts: for instance, Brazilian exports 
to the US would increase 9% while Brazilian imports from the US would increase around   
25%.
25 In a preliminary version of the paper only when non-tariff barriers were 
considered the impact on bilateral imports and exports became of the same magnitude.
26   
 
But all these estimates consider instantaneous trade liberalization and do not take into 
account of exclusions. US strategy in the FTAA negotiations is unlikely to contrast 
sharply with that adopted in the NAFTA negotiations. Kowalczyk and Davis (1998) h ave 
shown that the tariff  phase out in the NAFTA process took longer for high duty products 
and that liberalization in Mexico was correlated to US liberalization for the same 
products, suggesting an attempt to establish narrow reciprocity at the 8 -digit l evel. 
Panagaryia (1998) suggests that this may be an indication that US export interests in 
                                                                 
24 Results obtained by Dsiao, Díaz-Bonilla and Robinson (2002), based on IRTS and considering only the  
elimination of tariffs, generate similar rates of GDP increase for most economies. But for NAFTA their 
estimates are higher and for Central America and the Caribbean and the Andean Community much higher 
than those of Monteagudo and Watanuki (2002).    
25 These are in line with the partial equilibrium estimates of Abreu (1995) and Carvalho and Parente (1999). 
26 Monteagudo and Watanuki (2001).   24 
Mexico were concentrated in those sectors also enjoying high protection in the US and 
that the likelihood of trade diversion in the Mexican market is high.   
 
Recent research on reciprocal Brazil-US market access for goods and revealed 
comparative advantage
27 has shown that, at the 6 -digit level, to a certain extent, the 
relatively more competitive are Brazilian goods, the higher tends to be protection in the 
US market. In the Brazilian market, however, this relation is reversed, as the relatively 
more competitive US goods tend to face lower tariffs than the less competitive products. 
This is an indication that Brazilian exports to the US tend to be more adversely affected 
by protection than US exports to Brazil. 
  
The FTAA negotiation as any other trade negotiation involves countries endeavouring to 
maximize, or expedite, access to export markets of their partners and minimize, or delay, 
access to its own market given  an implementation time span. As pointed out by 
Panagaryia, every country would offer  liberalization which entails trade diversion first, 
leaving trade creation liberalization to the later stages of implementation. While 
reciprocity is an important essential feature of multilateral trade negotiations involving 
mostly big economies of not very dissimilar size, it is unlikely to have the same 
importance in the regional or subregional context since there are so sharp differences in 
the size of the different economies involved in the negotiations.
28   
 
The stance adopted by each country in international negotiation results from an internal 
negotiation involving interests which have may have gains or losses with the 
implementation of the initiative.
29 This complex  domestic negotiation involves many 
relevant players: government, consumers, taxpayers, multinationals, trade unions, 
exporters, purchasers of  inputs and capital goods, domestic producers of products likely 
to face increased competition from imports. 
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Are  there good reasons to postpone liberalization of sensitive products or, in a more 
extreme scenario, to exclude certain sensitive products in an overelastic interpretation of 
the hazy “substantially all trade” provision for FTAs under multilateral rules?
30 U S 
reliance on a trade negotiating strategy which postpones more relevant liberalization  – 
that is liberalization that affects inefficient domestic producers  – nothwithstanding, a 
“first things last” strategy from a strict efficient viewpoint may be justifiable under 
certain conditions.
  Grossman and Helpman (1994) have suggested that exclusions would 
reduce the government political costs in facing either the impact of trade diversion on the 
average voter, or the opposition of coordinated import-competing sectors, that is, loss of 
lobby income.
31 Bargaining over the ranking of sectors exempted would reflect bargain 
weights of different governments.  
 
Even supposing that an analysis emphasizing the role of contributions by affected sectors  
is relevant to all relevant governments in the FTAA context, more optimistic views, 
which would not put interpretations of what really  is  “substantially all trade” under 
undue stress, could result, for example, from substantially higher sensitivity by  
governments to the average-voter. This would contribute to make more likely 
liberalization over the board, or at least would moderate the incentives to delay 
liberalization which entails trade creation.  
 
The universal application of a formula or formulae to eliminate tariffs ( or tariff-
equivalent) levels of protection would have been an efficient instrument to assure that 
different governments do not feet drag and try to delay the impact of liberalization on 
their most protected producers. The impact of formulae as tariff-cutting criteria on tariff 
dispersion, an usual indicator of sensitivity, is even more rapid than on tariff levels. But 
the opportunity to adopt such formulae is past as the FTAA tariff negotiations are to be 
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conducted based on lists of products classified in d ifferent categories according the 
liberalization horizon: instantaneous, five years, ten years and a residual of sensitive 
products. The United States would wish to negotiate bilaterally different lists of products  
in each category with different FTAA partners. The negotiation would then tend to be of 
a “hub and spoke” character, the main differences being that there would be some 
possible economies of scale in the negotiating process and that trade liberalization would 
be simultaneous even if affecting different products in the case of each pair of countries. 
Other countries would prefer an approach regional MFN-based approach couples with 
provisions to take into account different levels of development among prospective 
members. 
 
In the negotiation on services, the US would prefer excluded sectors to constitute a 
negative list. Many Latin American countries would prefer a GATS-like positive list as 
this would  cope more adequately with the lack of detailed knowledge on the impact of 
liberalization on national providers of many services. In any case there is greater Latin 
American reluctance to liberalize services than goods: some countries wish to consider 
WTO-bound commitments as an initial basis for negotiation rather than actual access 
conditions. Other i mportant differences to bridge in services are the divergent views on 
local presence requirements and the flexibility of arrangements to accommodate 
movements of top managerial personnel.  
 
In the grey area between services and investment lie many of the t hornier problems to 
cope with in the negotiations, especially those concerning the provision of public 
services, such as transparency requirements or dispute settlement between foreign 
investors and host economies.While most of the issues involving trade-related investment 
measures seem non-controversial, attempts by Latin American economies to reopen some 
of the provisions of the agreements on TRIPS and subsidies reached in the Uruguay 
Round may be the origin of much heat. This is the case of banned performance 
requirements, particularly those which are export-related. Substantially more complex to 
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solve are the problems connected to different views on issues such as compulsory transfer 
of technology and other possible requirements related to treatment of FDI. 
 
Agricultural export subsidies are one of the main stumbling blocks faced by the 
negotiations as many of the their adverse effects are on markets outside the FTAA. While 
the dismantlement of such subsidies affecting intra-FTAA markets is feasible it is much 
harder to think of substantive remedies which would counter their impact in other 
markets. This is typically an issue which would be more adequately dealt with in 
multilateral negotiations rather than at the regional level. Similarly, antidumping and 
safeguards measures, which are a crucial part of the US protectionist armor, and 
increasingly so also of other big economies in the continent, if left as they stand could 
seriously undermine results of access negotiations. Tit for tat bilateral use of AD  is likely 
to put smaller economies at a disadvantage in relation to the US.  
  
While the US stance on some of the “new” issues has proved to be until now less 
sanguine than it was initially feared it is not impossible that such stance will harden 
during the negotiations as and if the pressure for complementary agreements à la NAFTA 
gains strength.  
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
The importance of obstacles in the path of successful FTAA negotiations should not be 
underestimated. Protectionist lobbies in the US and in Latin America, especially in the 
big and more protected economies, are stronger now than they were, say, a couple of 
years ago, and have been more successful in their bid to delay trade liberalization .  
 
US strategy based in delaying trade liberalization of sensitive products to the last possible 
moment, or to exclude such trade from the FTA agreement, is likely to be taken as an 
example by other countries. Trade creation liberalization is to be delayed and trade 
diversion to prevail in the shorter term. The negotiation of specific lists of products to be   28 
included in four categories, defined according liberalization schedule and sensitiveness 
on a bilateral basis, is a return to the hub and spoke model.  
 
A not always explicit difficulty faced in the FTAA negotiations is that there are many 
existing preferences which would be adversely affected by the implementation of 
comprehensive trade liberalization. The erosion of subregional preferences, especially 
those related to the US market, in the NAFTA context and also in Central America and 
the Caribbean, may act as a deterrent for a more active approach by economies likely to 
be affected by a reversal of trade diversion in the US market.   
  
The collapse of Argentina and macroeconomic instability in Brazil placed the  eventual 
macroeconomic advantages of an FTA including the United States in a relatively 
secondary position in the list of possible benefits of such an integrattion at least in a mid-
term perspective. To the extent, however, that binding trade liberalization commitments 
are made, there is a powerful implied macroeconomic discipline imposed by the sheer 
size of the main economy involved in the initiative. The scope for the adoption of 
unsustainable policies is significantly curtailed by the likely consequences on trade and 
FDI flows. Potential gains entailed by a convergence of interest rates in the direction of 
US levels are substantially higher than those related to trade. Curiously enough the 
impact of these imported macro-economic virtues has tended to  play a rather secondary 
role in the Latin American public debate on the FTAA. 
 
What can the US offer to Latin America which may clinch the deal? To a large extent 
what can be offered by the US that could ease the political pain of concessions by Latin 
America is concentrated in its list of sensitive products. This is why recent moves in the 
political economy of protection of the US tend to jeopardize successful FTAA 
negotiations.   
 
The bigger Latin America economies outside NAFTA are demandeurs of both a 
reduction of national discretion in the use of antidumping and safeguard measures as well 
as of further disciplines and scheduled elimination of agriculatural export subsidies or of   29 
policies producing equivalent results. The US resistance to the overhaul of such policies 
is substantial. The US could always surmount such difficulties by offering a more 
attractive access package but it is unclear whether this would make sense if these issues 
are to be dicussed multilaterally in Geneva.  
 
It must be kept constantly in mind that the FTAA and the WTO negotiations are closely 
intertwined. This is specially relevant in connection with issues such as antidumping and  
agricultural exports subsidies but also to a certain extent in relation to access, as MFN 
improved access is bound to have important consequences on FTAA trade, especially on 
those all-important exporters seeking to exploit opportunities created by FTAA-induced 
trade diversion. Countries negotiating the FTAA will keep a very attentive eye on Geneva 
and be, perhaps, reluctant to clinch an hemispheric deal without a full picture of 
multilateral developments. This could be an additional source of pressure to delay the 
FTAA negotiations if the Doha Round proves to be as protracted as its predecessors and 
the d eadline of 2005 is not binding. Most observers believe that an inevitable  
consequence of the European Union move to delay any decision to cut support under the 
Common Agricultural Policy ubtil 2007 will be a postponement of the date scheduled for 
the end  of the Doha Round. It is likely that this will also be relevant for the FTAA 
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